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The UNAnti-terror Sanctions
Regime under Pressure
Helen Keller* and Andreas Fischer**
1. Introduction
The plague of international terrorism has not only resulted in a ripple effect on
national legislative activity, particularly in the wake of the 11 September 2001
attacks, but it has also led to wide consensus within the international commu-
nity to adopt a prompt and effective response to counter the financing of
terrorism. In its fight against terrorism, the United Nations Security Council
(SC) has resorted to the same strategy inaugurated in 1997 (and supplemented
in 1998) with the introduction of travel and financial restrictions against
members of the UNITA1.
Targeting individuals, rather than a specific State, marked a qualitative
change in the SC’s sanctions policy. These so-called ‘targeted sanctions’, also
known as ‘smart sanctions’, have been introduced in a number of SC resolu-
tions directed against individuals and entities allegedly associated with the
Taliban and Al-Qaida. By means of Resolution1267,2 the SC, inter alia, required
States to freeze funds and financial assets controlled directly or indirectly by
the Taliban; likewise, Resolution 13333 ordered as much with regard to Osama
bin Laden and his associates. To these resolutions, blacklists were attached for
listing the targeted individuals and corporate entities. Resolution 13904
renewed the Taliban/Al-Qaida blacklists and expanded the reach of the sanc-
tions to any person associated with the Taliban, Osama bin Laden or
*Professor of Public International Law, University of Zurich; Member of the Human Rights
Committee (helen.keller@rwi.uzh.ch).
**PhD student at the Law Faculty of the University of Zurich (andreas.fischer@rwi.uzh.ch).
1 Portuguese acronym for Unia‹ o Nacional para a Independe“
_
ncia Total de Angola (National
Union for the Total Independence of Angola).
2 SC Res. 1267, 15 October 1999, S/RES/1267 (1999).
3 SC Res. 1333, 19 December 2000, S/RES/1333 (2000).
4 SC Res. 1390, 16 January 2002, S/RES/1390 (2002).
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Al-Qaida, imposing on the latter a travel ban and arms embargo. It was the first
resolution which dispensed with any link to a specific territory or State.5
The Resolutions setting out the targeted sanctions regime are binding on all
United Nations (UN) Member States because they were adopted under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
Under the three Resolutions, a Sanctions Committee was established with a
mandate to maintain a list of individuals and corporate entities that are to be
subjected to the sanctions as well as monitoring the implementation of the
sanctions by the States. Listings are done upon a corresponding request by
a State. Targeted individuals and entities may submit a request for de-listing
through the State of their residence or citizenship or through a ‘focal point’
in the UN Secretariat. The Sanctions Committee operates on the basis of
consensus.
In view of the grave consequences of these sanctions for the targeted
individuals, from a rule of law perspective, it is imperative that legal avenues
are available for individuals to claim some form of review of the measures
imposed on them. However, the lack of legal safeguards countervailing a possi-
ble arbitrary exercise of political power of the SC (through its Sanctions
Committee) has been a major problem with the SC targeted sanctions.
While initially, under Resolution 1267, sanctions were imposed without any
specific procedural standards, the procedural flaws have been addressed in
subsequent resolutions setting up listing criteria6 and providing for a ‘state-
ment of case’ to be submitted by the nominating State and obligatory notifica-
tion of inclusion on the list to the relevant individuals and entities.7
Furthermore, the establishment of a ‘focal point’ within the UN Secretariat8 to
which individuals can directly lodge their de-listing requests is certainly an
improvement, as the individual is no longer dependent on his State of national-
ity or residence to initiate a de-listing procedure on his behalf. A further wel-
come development has been the adoption of SC Resolution 1822, which
provides that the Sanctions Committee shall conduct a review of all names on
the UN sanctions list at the date of adoption of that resolution by 30 June
2010 and thenceforth to undertake ‘an annual review of all names on the
Consolidated List that have not been reviewed in three or more years . . ..’9
5 See Cameron, ‘UN Targeted Sanctions, Legal Safeguards and the European Convention on
Human Rights’, (2003) 72 Nordic Journal of International Law 159 at 164.
6 SC Res. 1526, 30 January 2004, S/RES/1526 (2004) called upon States to include in their list-
ing requests identifying and background information ‘to the greatest extent possible’ and SC
Res. 1617, 29 July 2005, S/RES/1617 (2005) clarified the meaning of the term ‘associated with’.
7 SC Res. 1617 mandated that proposing States submit a ‘statement of case describing the basis
of the proposal’. SC Res. 1735, 22 December 2006, S/RES/1735 (2006) specified the content of
the statement of case and provided for the obligatory notification of listed individuals and
entities, though this does not necessarily include the reasons for listing.
8 SC Res. 1730, 19 December 2006, S/RES/1730 (2006).
9 SC Res. 1822, 30 June 2008, S/RES/1822 (2008) at paras 25 and 26.
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Yet, these improvements are clearly insufficient.With respect to the listing
procedure, individuals have no right to be heard, let alone in the context of
judicial proceedings where a decision is rendered by an impartial judicial or
quasi-judicial body. Fair trial standards as enshrined in the relevant human
rights instruments are only engaged if the sanctions are considered to be ‘crim-
inal’ in nature, and not merely of a preventative, administrative nature as char-
acterised by the UN organs.10 Whilst views by scholars and (quasi-)judicial
bodies11 diverge on whether targeted sanctions are to be regarded as civil,
criminal, or administrative in character,12 the fact remains that the sanctions
which give rise to severe consequences for the targeted individuals are
imposed on them without there being any international legal mechanism for
reviewing the accuracy of the information forming the basis of a State’s listing
request or the proportionality of the measures adopted.13 Thus, ‘[t]here is still
the prospect that individuals might be listed based on mistaken identity.’14
To quote Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly investigator Dick Marty
(Switzerland): ‘A country proposes that a person be added, often without
giving any detailed reasons, even to the other members of the Sanctions
Committee, and the Committee agrees without hearing or even notifying the
person concerned.’15 Furthermore, the consensus nature of the Sanctions
10 The targeted sanctions are characterised by SC Res. 1735, supra n. 7, as being ‘preventative in
nature and not reliant upon criminal standards set out under national law’. See also the
Guidelines of the Committee for the Conduct of its Work, adopted on 7 November 2002 and
last amended on 9 December 2008, at para. 6: ‘A criminal charge or conviction is not neces-
sary for inclusion on the Consolidated List as the sanctions are intended to be preventive in
nature.’ The revised Guidelines are available at: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267_
Guidelines.pdf [last accessed 18 May 2009].
11 While not expressly pronouncing itself on the legal nature of the sanctions, the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) in Joined Cases C-402P and C-415/05P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al
Barakaal International Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the
European Communities [2008] ECR I-(nyr) held the fair trial guarantees and the right to an
effective remedy applicable. See Ziegler, ‘Strengthening the Rule of Law, but Fragmenting
International Law: The Kadi Decision of the ECJ from the Perspective of Human Rights’,
(2009) 9 Human Rights Law Review [in press]. In contrast, the Sanctions Committee in the
present case concluded that the sanctions were in effect administrative, see below.
12 For a discussion on the proper characterisation see, for example, Bianchi, ‘Assessing the
Effectiveness of the UN Security Council’s Anti-terrorism Measures: The Quest for
Legitimacy and Cohesion’, (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 881 at 905; and
van den Herik, ‘The Security Council’s Targeted Sanctions Regimes: In Need of Better
Protection of the Individual’, (2007) 20 Leiden Journal of International Law 797 at 806.
13 Cameron, supra n. 5 at 159. See also van den Herik, ibid at 798: ‘[S]till there is no possibility
whatsoever of some independent substantive review at UN level. Here again it becomes clear
that, more than anything else, the real stumbling block is the substantive review of intelli-
gence information by an independent and impartial organ.’
14 Marty, ‘United Nations Security Council and European Union blacklists’, Report of the
Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, ParliamentaryAssembly, 16 November 2007,
Doc. 11454 at Point C. II. ii. A., available at: http://www.assembly.coe.int/Mainf.asp?link¼/
Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc07/eDOC11454.htm [last accessed 12 April 2009].
15 Marty, ‘UN Security Council black lists: Introductory memorandum’, Committee on Legal
Affairs and Human Rights, Parliamentary Assembly, AS/Jur 9 (2007) 14, 19 March 2007,
ajdoc14 2007, available at: http://assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2007/20070319_ajdoc14.pdf
[last accessed 12 April 2009].
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Committee’s decision-making means that, once a name is on a list, any SC
Member can block its removal, even in the face of a national court decision
affirming the innocence of a listed individual, and despite the fact that the
State which originally submitted an individual’s name for listing itself requests
the removal of that individual from the sanctions list. The procedure at the
‘focal point’ is also political and based on consensus, lacking any proper legal
safeguards.
Over the past years, targeted sanctions have been the focus of criticism by
scholars, reports commissioned by international organisations16 and govern-
ments,17 and were not least challenged in legal proceedings. The most recent
case exposing the problems of wrong listings and the glaring deficiency of
the de-listing procedure concerns a Belgium coupleçNabil Sayadi, who is of
Lebanese descent, and his wife Patricia Vinck. Sayadi and Vinck were, respec-
tively, the director and secretary of Fondation Secours Mondial (FSM), the
Belgium office of the Global Relief Foundation (GRF), an Islamic charitable
organisation based in the United States. The United States suspected the GRF
of having provided financial and other assistance to, and receiving funding
from, individuals associated with Al-Qaida. On the basis of a request from the
United States, the GRF was placed on the Sanctions Committee list in October
2002. Subsequently, upon a proposal for listing by Belgium, the names of
Sayadi and his wife were added to the UN sanctions list on 22 January 2003,
which was subsequently appended to a European Community regulation18
and a ministerial order issued in the State party.19
The consequences for the Sayadi couple and their four children were harsh.
As a result of their listing, all of the couple’s financial assets were frozen and,
because of the travel ban, they could no longer travel within or leave Belgium,
and Mr Sayadi was unable to take up an offer of employment in another coun-
try. Mr Sayadi and his wife have neither been prosecuted nor convicted, and
they boast a clean criminal record.
Sayadi and Vinck submitted several requests in 2003 to the Belgian
Government, European Union (EU) Commission and to diverse organs of
16 See Cameron, The European Convention on Human Rights, Due Process and United Nations
Security Council Counter-terrorism Sanctions (commissioned by Council of Europe, 2006),
available at: http://www.coe.int/T/E/Legal_Affairs/Legal-co-operation/Public_international_law
[last accessed 10 April 2009]; and Fassbender, Targeted Sanctions and Due Process (commis-
sioned by the UN Office of Legal Affairs, 2006), available at: http://www.un.org/law/counsel/
Fassbender.study.pdf [last accessed 10 April 2009]..
17 See White Paper prepared by the Watson Institute, Strengthening Targeted Sanctions through
Fair and Clear Procedures, A/60/887^/2006/331 (2006), available at: http://www.watson
institute.org/pub/Strengthening_Targeted_Sanctions.pdf [last accessed 12 April 2009].
18 Commission Regulation (EC) No. 145/2003 of 27 January 2003 amending Regulation (EC) No.
881/2002 for the ninth time.
19 Ministerial order of 31 January 2003 amending ministerial order of 15 June 2000 implement-
ing the Royal Decree of 17 February 2000 concerning the restrictive measures directed
against the Taliban in Afghanistan.
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the UN in an attempt to have their names struck off the sanctions list. On
11 February 2005, after two and half years of investigation without an indict-
ment, the Brussels Court of First Instance ordered the Belgian State to file
a de-listing request with the Sanctions Committee. The Judge’s Chambers of
the Brussels Court of First Instance exonerated the plaintiffs of any suspected
criminal activities, dismissing the case on 25 February 2005. Although
Belgium promptly complied with the Court of First Instance’s ruling, and
repeated its de-listing request a year later, the de-listing procedures were
blocked each time by members of the Sanctions Committee. Thus, despite
these clear judicial decisions in favour of the plaintiffs, Sayadi and Vinck
continue to be subjected to the sanctions.
2. Disputed Competence
Whilst roaming the institutional landscape, Sayadi andVinck also filed an indi-
vidual complaint with the Human Rights Committee (HRC). Belgium disputed
the HRC’s competence to consider the complaint on the basis of Article 1 of
the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights 1966 (the Covenant)20 which stipulates that for a complaint to be admis-
sible, the individual in question must be subject to the jurisdiction of a State
party.21 Since its measures taken to implement the UN anti-terror sanctions
were dictated by its international obligations to comply with SC decisions
adopted under Chapter VII, Belgium alleged that the actions against Sayadi
and his wife fell beyond the scope of its domestic jurisdiction. Thus, Sayadi
and Vinck were not subject to Belgium’s jurisdiction within the meaning of
Article 1 of the Optional Protocol, and could not challenge Belgium’s measures
taken to implement its UN Charter obligations.22 In the same vein, in her
dissenting opinion, RuthWedgwood held that the complaint was ‘inadmissible
because it [pleaded] no cognizable violation by the State party’.23 In conclu-
sion, she stated that ‘[t]he only actions taken by Belgium were in accordance
with the binding mandate of the Security Council.’24
Belgium’s argument weighed heavily. Indeed, pursuant to Article 25 of the
UN Charter, States must accept and carry out the decisions of the SC, and
Article 103 of the UN Charter sets out the primacy of the States’ Charter obliga-
tions vis-a' -vis their other international obligations. It is generally argued that
because of the pre-eminent role of the SC and the importance of the interests
20 99 UNTS 171.
21 Sayadi andVinck v Belgium (1472/2006), CCPR/C/94/D/1472/2006 (2008); 16 IHRR 427 (2009)
at para. 6.1.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid. at Dissenting Opinion of RuthWedgwood.
24 Ibid.
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at stake, the SC enjoys a wide measure of discretion under Chapter VII both
to determine the existence of one of the situations that could trigger its
powers and in respect of the choice of measures contemplated under the
Charter to be employed. By signing the UN Charter, UN Member States have
implicitly accepted the supremacy of the SC, which is not checked by any
body with explicit powers to monitor and control it.25 Article 24 of the UN
Charter provides that the SC shall act in accordance with the purposes and
principles of the Charter, including the maintenance of international peace
and security in accordance with the principles of justice and international
law, and the protection and promotion of human rights. However, in the
absence of a judicial body at the UN level which could check the actions of
the SC, the latter, it is claimed, has the kompetenz-kompetenz in deciding to
what extent it is bound by human rights.26 However, to accept such an argu-
ment would be to accept the irrelevance of international law to international
politics. The debate about the limits to the SC’s exercise of its powers has been
a well-rehearsed topic. Here, it should suffice to state that the view of the SC
being unfettered by law is untenable. 27
Conceptually distinct from the previous issue is the question of whether
States are bound by the rule of law when implementing SC Resolutions. This
issue was addressed in SC Resolution 1456, according to which ‘States must
ensure that any measure taken to combat terrorism comply with all their
obligations under international law, in particular human rights, refugee and
humanitarian law . . .’.28 Hence, regardless of whether the SC sanctions are
consistent per se with international law, States are obliged to ensure that their
implementation does not violate international law.
25 Cameron, supra n. 5 at 174. Compare Belgium’s contentions in Sayadi, supra n. 21 at para. 6.3:
‘In ratifying the Charter, the State party transferred powers to the Security Council, and it
has subsequently ratified the Covenant. At the time when the State party ratified the
Covenant, the powers it had transferred to the Security Council were no longer within its
competence, and so the State party cannot be held responsible under the Covenant for how
those powers are exercised.’
26 Ibid. at 173.
27 Angelet, ‘International Law Limits to the Security Council’, in Gowlland-Debbas (ed.), United
Nations Sanctions and International Law (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001) 71; De
Wet, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council (Oxford: Hart, 2004) at
133^216; Dugard, ‘Judicial Review of Sanctions’, in Gowlland-Debbas, ibid. at 83; Gill, ‘Legal
and Some Political Limitations on the Power of the UN Security Council to Exercise its
Enforcement Powers under Chapter VII of the Charter’, (1995) 26 Netherlands Yearbook of
International Law 33; Lamb, ‘Legal Limits to United Nations Security Council Powers’, in
Goodwin-Gill and Talmon (eds), The Reality of International Law: Essays in Honour of Ian
Brownlie (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999) 361; Nolte, ‘The Limits of the Security Council’s
Powers and its Functions in the International Legal System: Some Reflections’, in Byers (ed.),
The Role of Law in International Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 315; and
Schweigman, The Authority of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: Legal
Limits and the Role of the International Court of Justice (The Hague: Kluwer Law International,
2001).
28 SC Res. 1456, 20 January 2003, S/Res/1456 (2003) at para. 6.
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The consistency of State conduct in the context of implementing SC
sanctions with legally binding rules is thus susceptible to judicial or
quasi-judicial review. As for the latter, the HRC concluded that while it could
not pass judgment on the legality of SC measures taken under the UN
Charter, it was competent to consider whether ‘a State party had violated
rights set forth in the Covenant, regardless of the source of the obligations
implemented by the State party’.29
3. Dilemma in International Law
As a matter of fact, the Belgian State found itself in a dilemma: if it chose to lift
the financial ban, it would breach its obligations under the UN sanctions
regime. If it left the sanctions in place against Sayadi and Vinck, without any
incriminating evidence found against them, it would violate their human
rights.
Concerning the merits, the Belgian Government maintained that, because of
the primacy accorded to UN Charter obligations by Article 103 of the Charter,
it had no option but to comply with the SC Resolutions.30 If Belgium was held
to be in violation of the Covenant, taken in isolation, Articles 25 and 103 of
the UN Charter would nonetheless absolve the Belgian State of responsibility
for failure to fulfil its lower ranking obligations under the Covenant.31
Furthermore, the Belgian Government asserted that it had taken all appropri-
ate measures within its powers to have the authors’ names de-listed.32
The HRC accepted Belgium’s argument that the SC sanctions, though involv-
ing serious consequences for the complainants, are of a preventive rather
than a punitive nature and thus cannot be characterised as ‘criminal’ for the
purposes of Article 14(1) of the Covenant.33 Consequently, fair trial guarantees
(Article 14) and the principle of legality of penalties (Article 15) were not
engaged. Nonetheless, the HRC held Belgium in breach of its obligations
under the Covenant. Concerning the liberty of movement as protected under
Article 12 of the Covenant, the HRC observed that because of the travel restric-
tions imposed on Sayadi and Vinck, the latter were unable to travel freely
within Belgium or to leave it. Measuring these restrictions against the yard-
stick of Article 12(3), it found that in view of the dismissal of the criminal
investigation against Sayadi and his wife in 2005 and Belgium’s requests for
the removal of their names from the UN sanctions list, these restrictions were
‘not necessary to protect national security or public order’and thus amounted
29 Sayadi, supra n. 21 at para. 7.2.
30 Ibid. at paras 4.12, 6.3 and 8.1^8.2.
31 Ibid. at para. 8.1.
32 Ibid. at para. 8.3.
33 Ibid. at para. 10.11.
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to a violation of Article 12.34 Furthermore, the HRC considered that the stigma-
tisation involved in the inclusion of the complainants’ names together with
their full contact details on the SC anti-terror list, and in view of the many
press articles tarnishing their reputation, amounted to an unlawful attack on
the honour and reputation of Sayadi and Vinck (Article 17).35 In its reasoning,
the HRC refuted Belgium’s argument that it was obliged to transmit the
names of Sayadi and his wife to the Sanctions Committee, in view of the fact
that Belgium was the only State to have transmitted names associated with
GRF to the Sanctions Committee, and because it did so without awaiting the
outcome of the national criminal investigation.36 Thus, the HRC found that
‘even though the State party is not competent to remove the author’s names
from the United Nations and European lists, it is responsible for the presence
of the . . .names [of Sayadi and his wife] on those lists.’37 With respect to
Belgium’s obligation to provide the complainants with an effective remedy
(Article 2), the HRC held that Belgium had to undertake all that was in its
power to have the complainant’s names removed from the list as soon as possi-
ble and to prevent similar violations from occurring in the future.38
In its reasoning, the HRC performed a balancing act. On the one hand, well
aware of the legitimacy problems involved in any pronouncement on the com-
patibility of the SC sanctions regime with the UN Charter, the HRC steered
around this delicate issue. On the other hand, it made it unambiguously clear
that State measures taken to give effect to SC resolutions must respect human
rights. Regardless of whether or not SC resolutions per se are consistent with
human rights, in implementing them the Member States do not have a carte
blanche; they are constrained by the rule of law. While the HRC’s decision is
merely directed against the Belgian State, it ultimately sends an indirect
signal to the UN, namely the SC.
4. Urgent Need for Reform
The HRC’s criticism is the most recent of a range of authoritative judicial
and quasi-judicial comments on the inadequacy of the extant system of
SC anti-terror sanctions. The procedural flaws involved in the process of adopt-
ing and implementing SC targeted sanctions have been exposed in various
judgments by the judiciary of the EU, such as in the Mojahedin39 and the
34 Ibid. at para. 10.8.
35 Ibid. at para. 10.13.
36 Ibid. at paras 10.7 and 10.13.
37 Ibid. at para. 10.13.
38 Ibid. at para. 12.
39 Court of First Instance, Case T-228/02, Organisation de Modjahedines du people d’Iran v Council
of the European Union, Judgment, 12 December 2006 (insufficient statement of reasons,
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Sison40 cases. In contrast to the Sayadi case, the listing in the Mojahedin and
Sison cases was not done on the basis of Resolution 1267, but pursuant to
Resolution 1373.41 Whereas under the former, listing was undertaken by the
Sanctions Committee, the latter Resolution left the listing task up to each
State. In the context of the EU, the lists were established and maintained by
the Council of the EU. In the Mojahedin and Sison cases, the European Court
of First Instance annulled the decision to place the complainants on the EU
anti-terror blacklist on the grounds that the Council of Europe had not pro-
vided sufficient reasons for listing the organisation and because the listing pro-
cedure did not respect the right to a fair hearing. As for listings under SC
Resolution 1267, a landmark ruling was issued by the ECJ in September 2008.
In Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council of the EU and Commission of the EC,42 the ECJ
was the first among regional and international tribunals to hold that the
sanctions imposed by the SC anti-terror resolutions infringed certain funda-
mental rights under European Community (Community) law, namely the
right to be heard, the right to an effective legal remedy and the right to prop-
erty. It also marked the first time that a court confirmed its jurisdiction to
review the lawfulness of a measure giving effect to a SC resolution. Despite
ruling that the implementing measureçCouncil Regulation (EC) 881/2002
of 27 May 2002çviolated fundamental rights under Community law, the ECJ,
like the HRC, was anxious to stress that its judicial review did not extend to
the SC resolution as such. It held that ‘any judgement by the Community judi-
cature deciding that a Community measure intended to give effect to . . .a
[UN SC] resolution is contrary to a higher rule of law in the Community legal
order would not entail any challenge to the primacy of that resolution in inter-
national law.’43 An application against Switzerland concerning the implemen-
tation of SC sanctions measures has also been lodged with the European
Court of Human Rights.44
While improvements have been made with regard to the listing and
de-listing procedures, these still fall short of full respect for the rule of law
principle. Importantly, the modus operandi of the listing process in the
violation of the applicant’s right to a fair hearing); Case T-256/07, People’s Mojahedin
Organization of Iran v Council of the European Union, Judgment, 23 October 2008 (insufficient
statement of reasons); and Case T-284/08, People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran v Council of
the European Union, Judgment, 4 December 2008 (violation of the applicant’s rights of defence
and right to effective judicial protection).
40 Court of First Instance, Case T-47/03, Jose Maria Sison v Council of the European Union,
Judgment, 11 July 2007.
41 SC Res. 1373, 28 September 2001, S/RES/1373 (2001).
42 Supra n. 11. See also Ziegler, supra n. 11.
43 Ibid. at para. 288.
44 Identical letters dated 23 June 2008 from the Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the
United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of
the Security Council, Enclosure: ‘Improving the implementation of sanctions regimes through
‘‘fair and clear procedures’’,’ A/62/891-S/2008/428, at 4, available at: http://www.security
councilreport.org [last accessed 12 April 2009].
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Sanctions Committee and at ‘focal point’are political. In this regard, a group of
countries45 have advanced the idea of establishing an independent, impartial
expert panel to assist the Sanctions Committee in the consideration of
de-listing requests. This would be a step in striking ‘a careful balance between
the competence and authority of the Security Council and its Sanctions
Committee(s) in the area of international peace and security on the
one hand, and the substantive requirements of ‘‘fair and clear procedures’’ on
the other’.46
It is to be hoped that the increasing criticism on the part of various interna-
tional (non-governmental) organisations will garner the necessary political
support to buttress the efforts to bring the anti-terror fight under the banner
of justice and the rule of law. Otherwise, the chances are that the UN coun-
ter-terrorism efforts may backfire. States may become increasingly reluctant47
to comply with the SC sanctions regime and submit new names for listing, or
may begin to lift the freezing of bank accounts and travel bans on their own
account. Such undercutting of the UN sanctions system would herald its end.
To be sure, fair listing and de-listing procedures, in enhancing the States’
perceived legitimacy of the SC targeted sanctions, would improve the sanc-
tions’ ‘compliance pull’48 and thus also their overall effectiveness. One should
be mindful of the words of former Secretary-General Kofi Annan: ‘[The
Security] Council has a very heavy responsibility to promote justice and
the rule of law in its efforts to maintain international peace and security.’49
45 The States concerned include: Denmark, Germany, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, Sweden
and Switzerland.
46 ‘Improving the implementation of sanctions regimes through ‘‘fair and clear procedures’’’,
supra n. 44 at 4.
47 Compare ibid.: ‘These deficiencies have caused countries to hesitate with the submission of
names for listing. They also underline existing concerns about the integrity and legitimacy
of targeted sanctions in general.’
48 See Franck,The Power of LegitimacyAmong Nations (NewYork: Oxford University Press, 1990)
at 24; and Hurd, ‘Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics’ (1999) 53 International
Organization 379 at 387ff.
49 Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan at the Security Council’s meeting on justice and the
rule of law, 24 September 2003.
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